On November 23, Heinrich Nax of the University of Zurich presents at ISEG the study "Convergence in the Experimental Double Auction".
Abstract:
Convergence to Walrasian competitive equilibrium in experimental continuous bid/ask double auctions is a finding of central importance in experimental economics and behavioral finance. First recorded by Smith (1962), and contrary to the common expectations in the field based on earlier results by Chamberlin (1948), DA markets do not fail to converge even under purely private information. This finding has been replicated and reproduced in numerous studies since, and convergence typically fails only when markets are strongly skewed towards one of the two market sides. The existing evidence has resulted in an informal folk result, whereby the DA is a robust market institution that tends to produce CE convergence reliably. In this talk, we present results from a large-scale online reproduction of the canonical experiments on the DA, and upgrade the folk result to a formal one, as we sample enough data at market level to conduct relevant hypothesis tests. The results shed light on the precise nature of the equilibration path, and implications for behavioral market design are discussed.
The research seminars will take place from September 21 to December 14, on Wednesdays, from 1:00 PM to 2:00 PM, at the Novo Banco Amphitheater (Quelhas Building, 4th floor).
Faculty from ISEG and other national and international schools will participate in the sessions, when they will address topics related with Economics, Management, Finance, Social Sciences, and Mathematics.
Free admission.
