While at home, politics is dedicated to mediocre discussions and distractions, outside, the world goes on. After 11 months of AD's government, everything seems to indicate that it will fall next week with a failed motion of confidence. The country is looking at this eventuality with little enthusiasm. There are many questions about the future, but before that I'll go over four points that are already known or can be guessed at. The first refers to what has happened so far: we have had a Prime Minister (PM) for almost a year, directly linked to the management of a company which, in turn, provides services to other companies with contracts with the state and from which it receives advances. Regardless of the depth of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) and/or the scrutiny that will be carried out voluntarily or involuntarily, it is unlikely that any illegality will be found, but rather something that is already understood by everyone - it is a large and ethically dubious mixture of recklessness, naivety and cynicism. The second point has to do with something I've just mentioned: a CPI that will be hard to escape. Last Saturday, Pedro Nuno Santos announced that he would request a CPI from the PM and, since then, this intention has been reinforced. What's more, it's becoming clear that whether Montenegro is re-elected or remains leader of the PSD, or whether the motion of confidence is approved (highly unlikely), the current head of government will have to undergo a lengthy and painful CPI. Only by leaving political life will he have a better chance of avoiding this process. Third point: in three months' time, either Pedro Nuno Santos or Luís Montenegro will no longer be in charge of their party. Defeated, either of them will almost inevitably leave office. If there is already a change of PSD candidate for the elections and a PS defeat, it could still happen to both of them. Finally: it seems clear that we are going to have an uninteresting and futile campaign. The pre-campaign has already begun and it's inevitable that the main focus will be on the PM's case. We're going to spend the next two months watching a deplorable blame game for political instability between the two largest parties, and the rest, naturally, won't make it easy. At best, the performance of the current government so far will also be debated with some interest. PUB . READ ON Moving on to the questions, the first one I'd like to ask is "who wants elections?" The vast majority of Portuguese will not. Neither will the parties to the left of the PS, given the very likely reduction they will suffer. IL may be the party that comes out of this last year with the fewest broken glass ceilings (apart from Tiago Mayan), so it won't be too opposed to these elections. Chega won't mind, even with all his recent "affairs and affairs", the opportunity provided by the slaughter taking place in the political center, but I'll get to that. My big question is about the will of the Social Democrats and the Socialists. As far as Pedro Nuno Santos is concerned, I think his main objective is to put pressure on and stifle the PSD, either through a CPI that lasts for months and seriously conditions the government, or through a campaign in which he manages to distance himself as much as possible from responsibility for what is happening. I believe that the first situation would be the least risky and most favorable to the PS, but it is now forced to go for the second, and it seems to have already begun to do so, whether or not it brings results. The truth is that, without the CPI and without having to wait too long, this would be the best time for the PS to go to the elections. Montenegro's will is clearer: he wants to go to the elections. However, in the same way that he received bad advice from those around him, or in the same way that he was naive, thinking that it would be possible to hide Spinumviva, this could also be happening now. What the PM thought, with his statements last Saturday, would happen would be: 1) either see the PCP's motion of censure rejected and continue to govern without the need to present a motion of confidence; 2) or, having to present it, see it through: a) or approved by the PS for fear of the blame it would have to bear, b) or failed. The latter scenario was the most likely, and that's what seems to be happening, largely because Montenegro doesn't want to go through a long and conditional inquiry, and thinks it's less risky to let the Portuguese go to the polls. I think he may be risking more than he thinks and wants to. The problem is that the PS's proposal for a CPI and the PM's poor handling of the case so far don't seem to put the blame on the Socialists at all, but rather (so far!) leave it on them. Montenegro may be too deluded to repeat Cavaco Silva's feat in 1987 - even though there are countless differences between the two leaders and contexts (especially the seriousness of the then PM, who was not suspected of anything in the eyes of the Portuguese). Another question is whether, despite his current strong conviction, the AD leader will remain in office. The structure of the PSD seems to be united around Montenegro, but surely many voices within the party will call for a change, dreamed up in the form of Passos Coelho or others. We'll see. My final question is "what happens in the aftermath of the next elections?" Starting with the case in which the PS emerges victorious, we don't see how it will be able to form a government. It will hardly have a left wing strong enough to support it or even to which it can form a coalition and, after the wound it has now opened, it will be equally difficult to have the support of the center-right. What will that bring us? In the event that AD emerges victorious, it will either achieve an absolute majority or the support of the IL to do so, or it will continue with a weak majority, and it is possible that the Socialists, already very fragmented after a second consecutive defeat and now with a new leader, will let this new government take office. Even so, the CPI will continue to wait for Montenegro. Of course, there's only one winner from all of this, Chega, who doesn't even need to do much in this crisis (apart from a hasty motion of censure in his own style), just watch the PS and PSD squabble while throwing fuel on the fire. I can't look at all this without remembering what Sérgio Sousa Pinto said here about a week ago, in an interview with O Discreto, when asked about the declining quality of our politicians: My great anguish is to think that the regime was made by people who were able to manage and govern it and, therefore, after the founding giants of the regime, the regime can no longer function so well with a generation that didn't have the responsibility to build it and that didn't have the responsibility to take care that it worked. I think that's the big risk, that people imagine they can do anything, that the regime can cope. While those who founded the regime know very well that the regime is easy and that it needs to be protected. ("Politics is history in the making" Interview with Sérgio Sousa Pinto) "Faced with all the guerrilla warfare that Chega is waging against the regime, the parties of the central bloc don't seem to be trying to save it at all costs, quite the opposite. Ever since I had what little political memory I have, I've been struck by this lack of awareness on the part of these parties of the need to look after the regime - after all, "their regime", their ecosystem. Regardless of what is constitutional or not, the last few years have shown that there is no respect or care for the regime, because "they can do anything, the regime can take it." In the last campaign, it was possible to ignore Chega because AD believed or made believe that by some miracle the legislature was going to go so well that the Portuguese wouldn't feel any need and would forget the existence of Chega in our political framework. A year ago, it was very easy for AD to say that, after eight years of socialism, it would avenge them and reform the country. Now, with the last socialist government having ended a year ago, it becomes more difficult to defend the thesis, on both sides of the center, that change and transformation still reside there. The solution may not be Chega, but it is a party that is fortunate enough not to have had any executive experience yet, so it can distance itself from those that have, and whose basis for revolt, which I believe is the one I highlighted above, is the one that more and more Portuguese share and the one that makes it grow. It is becoming increasingly difficult to defend the idea that the regime is not heading for a slow death. It is becoming increasingly difficult to defend the idea that the cause of the regime's degradation is only the current assault of the extreme right on politics, and not the lack of commitment of politicians from the parties at the center and founders of the regime to behave as they should so that it doesn't die. While at home, politics is dedicated to mediocre discussions and distractions, outside, the world continues, and now at an accelerated pace, raising new challenges, also for Portugal... Is anyone paying attention? Luís Rau Silva Student of Mathematics Applied to Economics and Management at ISEG. Co-founder of Discreto Luís Rau Silva